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Norms and Irony in the Biosciences: 
Ameliorating Critique in 
Synthetic Biology
Gary Edmond and David Mercer1
Abstract. This essay responds to Paul Rabinow’s contention that recent transformations in the 
practices and norms of the biosciences, exemplified in the emerging field of synthetic biology, de-
mand corresponding changes to the forms of knowledge and practices used by humanities scholars 
and policymakers wishing to understand and engage with them. Rabinow’s “Human Practices” 
approach embeds humanities scholars and social scientists with scientists in the course of ongo-
ing research endeavors (so-called upstream engagement). This approach aspires to develop new 
ways of conceptualizing scientific and engineering practices, and to promote philosophical aware-
ness among scientists and engineers—about what constitutes “the good life”—in ways that are 
coupled with scientific self-regulation. We wonder, drawing upon research traditions in the history 
& philosophy of science (HPS) and science & technology studies (STS), whether such an ap-
proach is likely to have much impact on the practices of synthetic biology. As our essay endeavors 
to explain, we doubt whether the environment(s) in which synthetic biology is being practiced 
will compel scientists to embark on these types of philosophical, social, and ethical reflections, 
or make them inclined to constructively engage with humanities scholars and social scientists. 
We also allude to the possible dangers of diluting external regulation and existing forms of ac-
countability for scientists and engineers. Our essay concludes in a register skeptical of Rabinow’s 
ironic response to the actual difficulties encountered in putting his philosophy into practice. This, 
we contend, indicates that more robust and reflective engagement with existing theoretical and 
empirical studies of science, engineering, and expertise would be at least as illuminating, if not, 
perhaps, as original.
Keywords: biopower, expertise, technology regulation, interdisciplinary collaboration, life sciences, 
law and science, human practices, collaboratory, engineering ethos
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I .  I n t r o d u c t I o n
Paul Rabinow is widely respected for the subtlety and sophistication of 
his scholarship, as a leading interpreter of the late Michel Foucault, for 
his anthropological studies of the biosciences, and for his attempts to ar-
ticulate what might broadly be defined as the implications of biopower.2 
In this essay we respond to Rabinow’s contention that recent transforma-
tions in the practices and norms of the biosciences demand correspond-
ing changes to the forms of knowledge and practices used by humanities 
scholars and policymakers engaging with the biosciences. More specifi-
cally, our commentary assesses Rabinow’s account of the emergence of 
the new field of synthetic biology and his participation in one of its flagship 
projects, namely SynBERC (the Synthetic Biology Engineering Research 
Center).3
There is, it is fair to say, some disagreement over the parameters of 
“synthetic biology” and residual disquiet over the appropriateness of the 
terminology. Generally, though, the field is understood to have “the de-
liberate design of biological systems and living organisms using engineer-
ing principles” at its core.4 Some of the definitional issues, and some of the 
continuing controversy, are undoubtedly attributable to the relative nov-
elty of the subject matters and approaches.5 Chronologically, it is signifi-
cant that the first international conference on synthetic biology was held 
as recently as 2.6 The SynBERC collaboration itself grew out of an 
application for funding to the National Science Foundation (NSF) shortly 
after this meeting when a group of scientists and engineers proposed to 
establish a program for research and development in synthetic biology in 
26. The grant proposal was successful and SynBERC was formed as an 
NSF Engineering Center. In addition to financial support from the NSF, 
SynBERC receives funding from a variety of public, private, and chari-
table sources. These include the state of California—where SynBERC 
forms part of the California Institute for Quantitative Biosciences—and 
a variety of venture capitalists and charitable trusts, including the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation.7 SynBERC’s multi-institutional and multi-
jurisdictional character is structurally entrenched. Participant researchers 
are based in the University of California campuses at Berkeley, San Fran-
cisco, and Santa Cruz, as well as at Harvard University, MIT, and Prairie 
View A&M University.
LAL2103_10.indd   446 10/19/09   4:18:07 PM
This content downloaded from 130.130.37.84 on Thu, 3 Jul 2014 01:16:25 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Edmond & Mercer  •  Norms and I rony in  the Biosciences
447
I I .  F lo u r I s h I n g  a n d  t h e  d e c o n s t r u c t I o n 
o F  p r a c t I c a l  j u d g m e n t
Rabinow has described the emergence of synthetic biology, along with his 
own participation in the SynBERC initiative, on a number of occasions. Un-
derstandably, here we focus primarily on the essay “Prosperity, Amelioration, 
Flourishing: From a Logic of Practical Judgment to Reconstruction” (repro-
duced earlier in this volume).8
One of the prominent features of Rabinow’s approach to synthetic biol-
ogy is a desire to capture and identify features of the emergent, and conse-
quently not entirely settled, practices of synthetic biology. Part of Rabinow’s 
ambitious approach is to simultaneously theorize and document his partici-
pation in SynBERC and the practice of synthetic biology. To a considerable 
degree these activities seem to involve the supplanting (i.e., discarding or 
ignoring) of traditional and implicitly inadequate vocabularies of bioethics, 
technology assessment, and science policy. We would include work by soci-
ologists, anthropologists, and historians of science and technology among 
the alternative approaches that seem to be either trivialized or ignored. The 
purported novelty of synthetic biology and the implicit irrelevance of earlier 
scholarly endeavors encourage Rabinow to use qualifications and caveats, 
specialized neologisms, concepts borrowed from diverse fields of inquiry, 
allusions to classical scholarship, and lashings of irony. In consequence, his 
assessments are fraught with ambiguity and metaphoric tension. Whether 
such an approach is necessary, desirable, or even defensible, as a precursor to 
a potentially more enlightened understanding of contemporary bioscientific 
initiatives, or a reflection of the difficulties he appears to encounter articulat-
ing a clear intellectual and genuinely collaborative role for his vision of a 
Human Practices program of interventions into synthetic biology, is one of 
the issues we aim to explore.9
Rabinow opens his essay with an interpretation of the primary features 
of synthetic biology. Here, he places emphasis on the fact that synthetic bi-
ology is not merely another form of science but rather a form of “biological 
engineering [that] will invent and implement technologies that will make 
better living things.”10 Its practitioners, unlike the visionaries of genome 
sequencing projects, seem to value processes of standardization and modu-
larization ahead of achieving abstract theoretical understandings. And syn-
thetic biology is:
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developing in and renovating a tradition nicely labelled the “Engineering Ideal 
in American Culture.” Synthetic biology aims at nothing less than the (even-
tual) regulation of living organisms in a precise and standardized fashion ac-
cording to instrumental norms.11
Rabinow recognizes that moving beyond this orientation towards efficiency 
and instrumental capacity building “opens up a series of topics calling for 
inquiry and deliberation.”12 Topics associated with intellectual property and 
ethics, but especially those falling loosely beneath the rubric of risk—such 
as biosecurity, which Rabinow suggests are of concern to scientists and engi-
neers—rank highly in his account.
Consistent with the call to move beyond contemporary forms of regula-
tion, technology assessment, and STS (Science and Technology Studies) and 
ELSI (Ethical Legal and Social Impacts) theorizing about engineering and the 
sciences, Rabinow tends to dismiss more “traditional” ethical concerns, such 
as possible challenges posed by the new genetic sciences to the “qualitative 
distinctiveness of life.” We are told, in an earlier essay by Rabinow, that:
DNA itself is universal; if there are questions to be posed about the qualita-
tive distinctiveness of living beings such questions must be posed at a different 
level. The specificity of species does not lie at the molecular level. The vision of 
the molecularization of life is, as they say, “so 9s.”13
Rabinow’s vision for the human sciences, contributing to understanding and 
addressing these “topics,” is governed by an overriding commitment to the 
idea that the life sciences will embrace a particular style of engineering ideol-
ogy that entails inevitable changes to the relationship between the human and 
life sciences.14 (At a later point, we return to consider whether uncritical com-
mitment to this metaphor may have subverted Rabinow’s ability to develop a 
coherent Human Practices program capable of anticipating and ameliorating 
synthetic biology’s social consequences.)
Moving more directly to SynBERC, Rabinow explains that the project is 
“designed around four core Thrusts.”15 Three of the Thrusts, namely Parts, 
Devices, and Chassis, are ostensibly technical: Parts is preoccupied with the 
“computational design and construction of cellular parts that can be assembled 
into ‘devices’”; Devices involves “assembling cellular ‘parts’ into ‘devices’ that 
can be re-used in a combination of systems”; and Chassis engages in “ build-
ing parts, devices, and systems that work inside living cells.”16 In combination 
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they aim “to link evolved systems and designed systems, with emphasis on 
organizing and refining elements of biology through design rules.”17
The fourth Thrust, in which Rabinow participates as a codirector, is de-
scribed as Human Practices. Rabinow contends that this Thrust offers some-
thing quite different from the goals and strategies offered by more conven-
tional attempts “to bring ‘science and society’ together into one frame so as to 
anticipate and ameliorate science’s ‘social consequences.’”18 He continues:
The task of Human Practices is to pose and repose the question of the ways in 
which synthetic biology is contributing or failing to contribute to the promised 
near future through its eventual input into medicine, security, energy, and the 
environment. The purpose of such a task is to assess this form-giving through 
critical examination.19
More specifically, Rabinow identifies the goals of Human Practices as bringing:
the biosciences and the human sciences into a mutually collaborative and en-
riching relationship, a relationship designed to facilitate a remediation of the 
currently existing relations between knowledge and care in terms of mutual 
flourishing. If successful, such practices should facilitate our current work in 
synthetic biology—understood as a Human Practices undertaking—through 
improved pedagogy and the invention of collaborative means of response.20
Pedagogy is not interpreted in the ordinary senses of training or teaching but 
is instead implicated in Rabinow’s concept of flourishing.
Pedagogy involves reflective processes by which one becomes capable of flour-
ishing. … it involves the development of a disposition to learn how one’s prac-
tices and experiences form or deform one’s existence and how the sciences, 
understood in the broadest terms, enrich or impoverish those dispositions.21
“Flourishing” is defined through reference to the classical term eudaemo-
nia. Drawn from Aristotle ’s discussion of ethics, “eudaemonia” refers to the 
good life—happiness, fulfillment, and felicity. According to Rabinow, the 
SynBERC scientists are keen to prosper through career development, finan-
cial rewards, and the recognition associated with their research success. In 
practical terms, one of the main goals of Human Practices, following from 
Rabinow’s recognition of the emergent qualities of synthetic biology and 
skepticism about traditional “science and society” approaches, is for human 
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scientists through various processes of evaluation, facilitation, engagement, 
and collaboration, to encourage SynBERC’s bioscientists to become highly 
reflective about their practices. It is out of this collaboration and reflection that 
the new practices constituting the discipline of synthetic biology will emerge. 
It is through consideration of how their practices enhance the good life that 
scientists and engineers (and human scientists) are enabled to flourish.
Although Rabinow acknowledges that the elite scientists and engineers en-
gaged in Thrusts 1 through 3 (i.e. Parts, Devices, and Chassis) may not wish to 
collaborate, there is a sense in which resistance is unlikely to be sustainable:
Adequate pedagogy of a bioscientist in the twenty-first century entails active 
engagement with those adjacent to biological work: ethicists, anthropologists, 
political scientists, administrators, foundation and government funders, stu-
dents, and so on. Contemporary scientists, whether their initial dispositions 
incline them in this direction or not, actually have no other option but to be 
engaged with multiple other practitioners. The only question is how best to 
engage, not whether one will engage. Pedagogy teaches that flourishing is a 
lifelong formative process, one that is collaborative, making space for the active 
contribution of all participants.22
This is consistent with Rabinow’s teleological belief that the biosciences are 
destined to embody a highly conventionalized engineering ethos.
We have not endeavored to reproduce all of the details of Rabinow’s theo-
retical architecture or the complex relationships between the various concepts 
developed in an attempt to capture the subtleties of Human Practice praxis. 
Nevertheless, before proceeding it is useful to introduce the concept of equip-
ment. Basically, “equipment” refers to the “truth claims, affects, and ethical 
orientations” that will be needed “to reconfigure and reconstruct the relations 
between and among the life sciences, the human sciences, and diverse citizen-
ries both national and global.”23 Rabinow seems to appreciate that construct-
ing equipment will be challenging.
I I I .  p r e pa r I n g  F o r  t h e  g o v e r n a n c e  o F 
s y n t h e t I c  b I o lo gy  ( by  h u m a n  p r a c t I c e s )
Looking beyond the broad programmatic rhetoric promoted by Rabinow, we 
can obtain an impression of the kinds of contributions that Human Practices 
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might make to synthetic biology and, more specifically, compare them with 
more conventional approaches (including those associated with “science and 
society” and STS). Earlier we drew attention to the centrality of—and to 
some extent preoccupation with—risk and biosecurity issues associated with 
synthetic biology. Those engaged in the Human Practices Thrust have dis-
cussed security issues elsewhere, and these more detailed expositions help us 
to understand Rabinow’s approach.
In an Anthropology of the Contemporary Research Collaboratory (ARC) concept 
note entitled “Response to Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance,” Rabi-
now and his colleagues, Gaymon Bennett and Anthony Stavrianakis, begin to 
explain how Human Practices might contribute to the governance of synthetic 
genomics.24 In so doing they seek to distinguish their approach from more con-
ventional orientations (and, at least implicitly, alternative approaches not con-
sidered) by critically reviewing a key report funded by the Sloan foundation: 
Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance (hereinafter Synthetic Genomics or 
the Report).25 According to Rabinow and his colleagues, Synthetic Genomics 
aimed “to formulate governance options that attempt to minimize safety and 
security risks from the use of synthetic genomics while allowing its development 
as a technology with great potential for social benefit.”26 The Report identified 
three broad sets of factors influencing security challenges from synthetic biol-
ogy. They are technical innovation, the political environment, and uncertainty.
Rabinow, Bennett, and Stavrianakis contend that Synthetic Genomics ad-
dresses biosecurity issues within the frameworks of safety and security. Their 
critique, which follows, highlights the weaknesses of such framing choices. 
They explain how the safety framework in Synthetic Genomics inadequately ad-
dresses the problem of potential dangers by proposing the development of 
technical safeguards and procedures such as licensing and screening those 
who have access to DNA synthesis.
Rabinow, Bennett, and Stavrianakis suggest that:
[t]hese measures are valuable as far as they go. However, given the kinds of 
problems identified in the [Synthetic Genomics] report, it should be clear that 
they are not sufficient. The report acknowledges that rogue scientists have 
ready access to the “know-how” if not the materials and technologies of DNA 
synthesis; what’s more, these scientists may not form part of the community 
that would adhere to best practices. Neither challenges related to new political 
environments nor challenges introduced by uncertainty can be adequately ad-
dressed through the introduction of technical safeguards.27
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The other approach to biosafety advanced in Synthetic Genomics is described 
as a security framework. The Synthetic Genomics report suggests that a security 
framework, in conjunction with the safety framework, provides a superior set 
of resources for dealing with biosafety. While Rabinow and his colleagues ap-
pear to recognize some overlap between these categorizations—for, notwith-
standing technological preoccupation, safety frameworks involve licensing 
and regulation, which are implicitly linked to the broader political contexts 
in which the technologies operate—they argue for the supremacy of security 
frameworks because they more explicitly incorporate concerns relevant to the 
political environment. Examples might include the emergence of malicious 
and unpredictable actors, and the potential for new media to facilitate unprec-
edented access to scientific knowledge and technical know-how. Moreover, 
uncertainties may originate in foreign states and beyond the scope of tradi-
tional modes of regulation. The implications of such developments may be 
similarly promiscuous.
Nevertheless, Rabinow and his colleagues remain critical. For, although the 
security framework outlined in Synthetic Genomics may reveal uncertainties 
and risks, it endeavors to address them within the context of traditional gov-
ernance frameworks and offers “no concrete proposals for developing frame-
works” to confront them.28 In contrast, Rabinow, Bennett, and Stavrianakis 
suggest that uncertainty requires a new approach, transcending the safety and 
security frameworks advanced in Synthetic Genomics. They propose, as an al-
ternative, preparedness, and endeavor to explain how such an approach might 
be realized through Human Practices.
According to Rabinow, Bennett, and Stavrianakis:
As a technical term, preparedness is a way of thinking about and responding 
to significant problems that are likely to occur (e.g. a bio-terrorist attack or the 
spread of a deadly virus), but whose probability cannot be feasibly calculated, 
and whose specific form cannot be determined in advance. In the face of un-
certainty, a logic of preparedness highlights the need for vigilant observation, 
regular forward thinking, and ongoing adaptation. As with matters of security, 
the [Synthetic Genomics] report identifies challenges of preparedness, but offers 
no concrete proposals for dealing with such challenges.29
In linking “preparedness” to other aspects of Human Practices, such as collab-
oration, Rabinow’s strategy for dealing with biosecurity issues would appear 
to involve reshaping scientific culture so it becomes more vigilant and more 
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capable of managing uncertainty. Accepting that “preparedness” might sub-
sume specific regulatory proposals, by offering a broad orientation in which 
specific regulations might be incorporated, it is far from obvious how this 
approach (and nomenclature) affords anything more concrete or viable than 
conventional approaches to uncertainty—such as those described in Synthetic 
Genomics—however familiar or flawed these might be.
Within the architecture of Human Practices, preparedness accords with 
Rabinow’s commitment to the self-regulation (or internal regulation) of syn-
thetic biology. Bioscientists, appropriately imbued via pedagogy and collabo-
ration with human scientists, should have a sufficiently well-developed sense 
of flourishing to be trusted to undertake biological research with a sense of 
preparedness that would appropriately anticipate biosecurity issues and risks. 
Whether such a sense of flourishing would imbue bioscientists with the req-
uisite skills to successfully undertake such a role is an obvious question. And 
such processes are likely to be far more demanding—to the extent that they 
are even possible or useful—than Rabinow implies.
In a recent Hastings Center report ethicist Michael Selgelid drew attention 
to some of the basic problems with proposals for scientific self-regulation in 
relation to bioterrorism:
Scientists might be best able to recognize a discovery’s scientific or technical 
implications for making particular biological weapons, but they have no special 
expertise to determine the identity, abilities, or intentions of potential bioter-
rorists. And scientists have no special expertise to assess what the security—as 
opposed to health—implications of attack with particular biological weapons 
would be.30
Amidst the criticisms of existing safety and security frameworks, Rabinow 
notes that part of their weaknesses stems from the inability to deal with (so-
called “rogue”) scientists not bound by scientific norms, and their failure to 
offer “concrete proposals.” This last apprehension seems to be broadly based. 
The critique of Synthetic Genomics is, in consequence, exemplary. But this 
begs the question of how “preparedness” offers any substantial advance over 
existing approaches and known weaknesses. Interestingly, recourse to “pre-
paredness” places the very norms and ethical sensibilities that are currently 
under considerable pressure from deregulation, privatization, commercializa-
tion (in the West), and the breakdown of governance structures through the 
fracturing of the states once composing the Soviet bloc in the East, under even 
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greater strain.31 Though sensitized to the need for policymakers to attend to 
developments and practices “upstream,” Rabinow’s approach implies a re-
treat from serious “downstream” engagement with science and scientific out-
puts and places considerable faith in surprisingly idealized bioscientific norms 
(more below). In this way the approach, thus far, seems naive in relation to 
both theorization and the possibility of constructing tangible spaces for effec-
tive upstream engagement.
The promotion of “preparedness” implies a strong capacity for collabora-
tion between human scientists and bioscientists. Such collaborations, as Rabi-
now’s own experience and frustration demonstrate (of this, more below), are 
fraught with difficulties. Moreover, in deference to his bioscientific collabora-
tors, Rabinow and his Human Practices colleagues appear ill-prepared, and 
perhaps more poorly positioned, to prescribe, even in the most elementary 
terms, what types of regulation(s) and collaboration might assist with “pre-
paredness” (and safety and security) and how they might facilitate “flourish-
ing,” along with the depth of collaboration required to generate the level of 
knowledge and competence needed to credibly regulate synthetic biological 
endeavors.
I v .  u p s t r e a m  w I t h o u t  a  pa d d l e ?
At this juncture we propose to consider how Rabinow’s model of Human 
Practices might influence the development of synthetic biology and antici-
pate or ameliorate its social consequences. We aim to undertake this by: (A) 
unpacking the way Rabinow links “upstream engagement” with the engineer-
ing ideal in American Culture; (B) hypothesizing about what his visions for 
engagement might mean in practical settings involving interactions between 
law and the new biosciences; (C) interrogating “flourishing” and its appar-
ently parochial implications; and finally, (D) noting that Rabinow’s model of 
upstream engagement may not only be flawed in terms of its putative conse-
quences but may not even be susceptible to instantiation.
a. engineering Ideology in america
Proffering favorable parallels between the engineering ideal in American 
culture and the emergence of synthetic biology (along with a thinly veiled 
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ironic allusion, to Fox Keller, that bioscientists will have a “feeling” for their 
organisms), from the outset Rabinow provides hints about his vision of the 
role of the analyst and its relationship to an engineering ethos.32 On its face, 
the engineering ideology apparently motivating synthetic biology (and Syn-
BERC) seems to leave limited scope for engagement with alternative concep-
tualizations of knowledge claims, or different interpretations of the direction 
of research, let alone provide the space or resources with which to contest the 
trajectories of technological innovation.
In a discussion paper endeavoring to explain the context for synthetic biol-
ogy’s embrace of the American engineering ideal, Rabinow drew upon the 
work of historian Philip Pauly:
It was early in the century that a move away from the holism of the living or-
ganism and its milieu as a privileged and distinctive site of bio-science initiated 
a century long process that Philip Pauly has aptly called “biological modern-
ism.” Pauly identifies a key aspect of this process of the entry into the life sci-
ences of what he calls the American engineering ideal of “just do it,” and figure 
out later what it means or why it works.33
For Rabinow, the analyst appears to pay for his participation by becoming 
embedded—albeit upstream inasfar as he is actually participating in the early 
phases of technical development—in a seemingly linear process of technologi-
cal innovation and application. Unlike other recent attempts to facilitate up-
stream engagement in science projects and research—such as through nanotech 
juries and consensus conferences, which aim to shape the direction of research/
knowledge—the engineering ethos implies an engagement with the assessment 
and/or amelioration of the impacts of existing products and prototypes.34
An example that helps to illustrate the tendency for such an approach to 
drift into the realms of technological determinism and the promotion of “tech-
nological fixes” arises out of the claims made for one of SynBERC’s most 
celebrated projects, the cheaper manufacture of a relatively scarce antimalaria 
medicine, artemisinin. Research and development funding for this project has 
been supplied by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. While we do not 
quibble with the contention that the production of cheaper artemisinin via 
synthetic biology could save lives, particularly in developing countries, ap-
proaching the problem of malaria treatment/management from within an en-
gineering framework may trivialize some of the broader social and economic 
factors involved in managing and treating the disease.
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In an overview of the ethics of synthetic biology, produced for the IDEA 
League Summer School, at Delft University of Technology, some of the so-
cial problems with such a narrow vision of the processes involved in technical 
innovation are brought into view:
Although a cheap drug against malaria would indeed save a lot of lives espe-
cially in poor Southern countries, it is the question whether the money invested 
in synthetic biology to create yeast strain to produce artemisinic acid . . . is the 
best and most efficient way of combating mortality of malaria. Farmers in East 
Asia and in some parts of Africa are growing wormwood or artemisia annua for 
drug production in developed countries and the farmers of wormwood would 
be out of business. There might be alternative ways of preventing people from 
dying from malaria, for example ways to prevent people from being bitten by 
malaria carrying mosquitoes.35
Moreover, the synthetic production of artemisinin is likely to operate in con-
formity with existing patterns of subservience and dependency. For it is un-
likely, under existing trade regimes and intellectual property agreements, that 
developing countries will be able to manufacture or purchase synthetically 
produced artemisinin at affordable rates.36
Historically, and especially in the U.S. context, the “engineering ideal” 
signifies not only industrial technical experimentation, self-regulation, and 
rapid technical innovation, but simultaneously represents periodic failures, 
conflicts, lawsuits, and recriminations about paths both taken and avoided.37 
Rabinow’s implicit rejoinder to the problem of the human scientist passively 
constrained in the frame of synthetic biology’s engineering ideology is for 
their collaboration with bioscientists and engineers to facilitate processes of 
critical self- and social-reflection by these bioscientists about their work and 
its implications. Rabinow’s analysis invests a high level of confidence in re-
search scientists and engineers with a range of financial, professional, and per-
sonal interests in their research.38 With something of a Saint Simonian view 
of benevolent technocracy, he suggests that the self-interests (especially pros-
perity) of bioscientists will have an easy correspondence with broader social 
ideals of prosperity (and flourishing).39
b. the “collaboratory” in the courtroom
Having examined some of the broader issues of Rabinow’s vision we can 
move to consider some of the implications for synthetic biology in legal 
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contexts. This focus, well suited to an essay for a law and literature audience, 
may help us to consider the value of Rabinow’s proposal for retheorizing evi-
dence law, intellectual property, and even the regulation of biomedical and 
bioscientific research. We pay particular attention to possible implications of 
Rabinow’s models of intense collaboration, which would, if successfully ad-
opted (through the collaboratory), encourage the dissolution of traditional 
boundaries of expertise.40
One point of departure is to consider the impact of new models of scien-
tific practice and new models of collaboration on something as apparently 
mundane as admissibility jurisprudence. Significantly, scientific and tech-
nical evidence have, in recent decades, been credited with creating serious 
problems for courts in virtually all Western jurisdictions, but especially in 
Anglo-American adversarial legal cultures.41 It is interesting to consider what 
the approach(es) promoted by Rabinow might offer to those involved in de-
termining whether expert evidence should be admitted in legal proceedings, 
as well as how to understand bioscientific research and practice when apply-
ing intellectual property laws and/or adjudicating property rights (associated 
with new entities, processes and techniques).
While helping to draw attention to the complexity of bioscientific practice 
and collaboration, in pragmatic legal contexts the kinds of Human Practices 
approach being promoted would tend to substantially complicate practice 
with little conceptual or practical clarity and apparently few institutional 
benefits.42 We accept that Rabinow’s recognition of the multidisciplinary and 
even interdisciplinary dimensions of contemporary bioscience might capture 
some of the complexity of scientific practice and new types of institutional-
ization, but it is unlikely that U.S. courts would be particularly responsive to 
his extensive unfamiliar and idiosyncratic vocabulary to describe these new 
relationships.43
Furthermore, embedding social scientists or humanities scholars (such as 
Rabinow) with unclear (and even contested) status—regarding the nature 
and quality of their contribution to the production of synthetic biological 
knowledge/artifacts— would also be problematic in courts that may be con-
fronted with the task of assessing or weighing the value of competing expert 
knowledge claims in the assessment of property rights, scientific outputs, or 
risks. U.S. courts have generally been reluctant to receive social scientists and 
humanists—even those with specialized research interests and experience 
in studying expertise, science, and technology—as expert witnesses where 
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scientists, engineers, and technicians are available.44 Human Practices person-
nel would probably have their participation in legal contexts, in disputes over 
ownership or regulation, limited to lay or eyewitness testimony. It would tend 
to be restricted to the provision of information about things like the dates 
when something was “discovered,” observations about who “participated” in 
relevant work (based on ethnographic research or interactions with research-
ers), and possibly field notes to the extent that any of these might inform the 
reconstruction of events coproduced by the lawyers and scientists.45
Things don’t improve dramatically when we turn to intellectual property 
rights and the regulation and promotion of science and technology. If any-
thing, property rights tend to reflect power relations and, in scientific re-
search at least, will tend to indicate the perceived utility of Human Practices 
(and social scientists and humanists) to those involved in bioscientific re-
search. Here, notwithstanding the fact that scientists and engineers have for 
decades confronted a range of formalized ethical, funding, regulatory, and 
legal hurdles, property rights have primarily been invested in scientists, engi-
neers, and their institutions. The other major group to obtain property inter-
ests are those actually supplying the capital. Unlike other participants, those 
in the Human Practices Thrust may have to flourish and prosper largely (or 
entirely) without direct access to property rights and profits. For the inclu-
sion of additional participants threatens to dilute any dividends by extending 
them to those whose input may be perceived as anything from limited or 
trivial to unnecessary and imposed. Unavoidably, ideas about flourishing and 
prosperity are indexed to perceptions about the utility of contributions. Of 
interest, even those currently central to the socioeconomic organization of 
bioscientific research, such as intellectual property lawyers, and to a lesser 
extent ethicists (and ethics panels), have obtained few of the financial benefits 
beyond, respectively, substantial fees and new types of employment, engage-
ment, and status.
As for regulation, the new conceptual apparatus and innovative multidis-
ciplinary collaborations seem set to circumvent traditional forms of appraisal 
and/or preempt intrusive constraints (imposed by outsiders, particularly those 
“downstream”). Instructively, recent criticisms of biomedical research sug-
gest that commercial sponsorship, and recourse to private research institu-
tions (rather than universities and academic health centers) to conduct clinical 
trials, along with the suppression of unfavorable results, has afforded Pharma 
much greater control over the approval of drugs and therapeutics.46 Notably, 
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assessments of what counts as “unfavorable” tend to be as sensitive to market-
ing potential, profits, and corporate image as to efficacy and safety.
In recent decades there has been widespread condemnation of the de-
regulation of biomedical research—along with the fees and negotiation as-
sociated with the consensus regulation of pharmaceuticals and therapeutic 
goods.47 One of the primary issues is concern that consensus regulation has 
made regulators familiar with and even financially dependent on those they 
are responsible for regulating. A considerable portion of the FDA budget, for 
example, is dependent on the fees paid by those whose products are being as-
sessed. Regulators, in consequence, have been funneled into an asymmetrical, 
yet increasingly dependent, relationship. Research scientists are also exposed 
to conflicts of interests through their direct relations with private corpora-
tions and ownership of shares and/or property rights in the products they 
are developing.48 Such conflicts of interest and the influence of private (i.e., 
for-profit) sponsors have created serious difficulties for medical practitioners 
and the technically competent staffs administering the leading biomedical 
journals.49 Are there grounds for believing that embedded anthropologists (or 
other human scientists), whose prospects may be dependent upon the success 
of bioscientific research groups, will afford more effective forms of partici-
pation and regulation (regardless of whether they have an enhanced appre-
ciation of the ways the research is being undertaken)? Will the participation 
of potentially interested nonscientists improve safety and security or will it 
facilitate further deregulation?
We can obtain some sense of the difficulties not only of regulation, but 
even of collaboration and participation, if we consider research into biofu-
els or the creation of new types of biological weapons. We can, for example, 
imagine some scientists and human scientists believing that attempts to de-
velop biofuels may be inappropriate given the food implications for many of 
those living in developing countries. (This resonates with the earlier refer-
ence to artemisinin.) Principled objections to new types of biological weapons 
probably require even less explanation. Yet, if a human scientist was opposed 
to the use of biofuels or weapons research on principle (or for any reason—
including conflicts of interest), would she be able to meaningfully participate 
in the collaboratory? If so, is her role one of “sabotage,” or should she partici-
pate in an attempt to persuade? Based on Rabinow’s experience in SynBERC, 
we wonder whether those with critical perspectives would ever be granted 
genuine opportunities to collaborate or flourish.
LAL2103_10.indd   459 10/19/09   4:18:10 PM
This content downloaded from 130.130.37.84 on Thu, 3 Jul 2014 01:16:25 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Law & L i tera ture  •  Vo lume 21,  Number  3
460
Here the possibility of participation and engagement might be illuminated 
by the experiences of jurors in death penalty cases. Typically, only those who 
believe in the death penalty and would, in principle, be willing to convict can 
serve on a jury in capital trials. It might not be considered insignificant that 
those who believe in the death penalty seem to be far more ready to convict. 
Jurors less committed to capital punishment, along with criminal defendants, 
often find it more difficult to flourish in these pro-death contexts. This leads 
us to ponder whether those embedded in synthetic biology collaborations—
whether scientists or nonscientists—are typically positively disposed to the 
kinds of research and practice undertaken. And, if so, what effects will such 
dispositions exert on the potential for, and interest in, upstream regulation. 
To the extent that those involved in Human Practices are conflicted through 
property rights, rewards, ideological alignments, and even continuing em-
ployment, the hope of meaningful regulation, the interests of broader publics, 
and responses to critics would all seem to be at risk.
c. Flourishing in perspective
Another problem, indexed to both the regulation and the success of synthetic 
biology and Human Practices, relates to “flourishing” and its reach. Most of 
the discussion of flourishing (and prosperity) in Rabinow’s essay is directly 
linked to individual scientists and engineers with the hope that any localized 
success will somehow flow on to human scientists and trickle down to the 
broader U.S. society. There seems to be little concern about, or consideration 
of, the implications of these new types of organizations and interactions—
euphemistically characterized as collaborations—for individuals and com-
munities beyond the collaboratory.
In the way it manifests in Rabinow’s writings, flourishing seems to be a par-
ticularly parochial concept. It is perhaps unremarkable to find that there is less 
discussion of the apparently important biosecurity dimensions, the implica-
tions of this work and what they might mean for those endeavoring to flourish 
in foreign domains or U.S. veterans’ hospitals. We are left to wonder about the 
respective application of flourishing to those involved in producing biologi-
cal weapons and those upon whom they are aimed (or might be aimed). We 
might also wonder about the appropriateness of a term such as “flourishing” 
to represent the success and prosperity of those involved in the generation 
of products, such as genetically modified foods, that have been opposed (on 
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whatever grounds) by citizens in many liberal democracies. Though not con-
sidered, there may be tensions between localized flourishing within scientific 
research collectives and the vibrancy of participatory democracy.50
One of the curious features of Rabinow’s work is the failure to theorize the 
relationship between parochial forms of prosperity, flourishing, and security 
and their implications for the prosperity, flourishing, and security of more re-
mote national and international communities and individuals. On what basis 
does Rabinow, or his bioscientific collaborators, represent or accommodate 
the interests of others or their hopes, aspirations, and visions for the good 
life?
d. collaboratory life: collaboration or capture?
Notwithstanding their putative inevitability, the kinds of multidisciplinary 
collaborations advanced in Rabinow’s writings seem to be fraught with prac-
tical difficulties. Unfortunately, these practical problems tend to be treated in 
an ironic or playful register. This response tends to supplant any systematic 
endeavor to consider their implications for the collaboratory or the develop-
ment of pragmatic ways of addressing them.
From the outset, it would appear that even though synthetic biologists may 
acknowledge some of the social implications of their work, they maintain a 
conspicuous preference for forms of self-regulation.51 Through reference to 
the origins of SynBERC, Rabinow and Bennett provide glimpses into strains 
that pre-date the Human Practices initiative. Even before Human Practices 
was conceived, there were tensions in the attempt to incorporate ethical, legal, 
and political considerations into SynBERC’s broader scientific and technical 
agenda.
Rabinow was not in fact the first human scientist attached to the consortium. 
The NSF awarding the SynBERC grant was contingent upon the inclusion of 
an ethics component. To satisfy this condition, Stephen Maurer, a lawyer and 
adjunct professor in economics at Berkeley, entered the project. This first gen-
eration of human science engagement in SynBERC was short-lived. Maurer 
proposed mechanisms to monitor “experiments of concern” and procedures 
for the community of synthetic biologists to vote on a set of controls to govern 
their relationship with the emerging DNA synthesis industry. These propos-
als were ultimately published in a report funded by the Sloan Foundation but 
were not incorporated into SynBERC’s operations.52 According to Rabinow 
LAL2103_10.indd   461 10/19/09   4:18:11 PM
This content downloaded from 130.130.37.84 on Thu, 3 Jul 2014 01:16:25 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Law & L i tera ture  •  Vo lume 21,  Number  3
462
and Bennett, the ethics component of SynBERC broke down amid personal-
ity conflicts and disagreements over who would set the terms for governance 
and regulation.53 In the wake of this breakdown Rabinow and Ken Oye, a 
professor of political science at MIT, were invited to take (over) responsibility 
for the ethics/human sciences component of SynBERC.54
Prior to his involvement with SynBERC, Rabinow was attentive to syn-
thetic biology through his anthropological studies. He had, not insignifi-
cantly, been an invited speaker at the first two international synthetic biology 
conferences at MIT in 2 and Berkeley in 26.55 Rabinow recounts how 
the invitation to join SynBERC offered an exciting opportunity to reinter-
pret the mandate from the NSF to incorporate ethical and social issues into 
its operations:
[I]t would be an exciting challenge to try to think through and put into practice 
a “post ELSI” [Ethical Legal and Social Impacts] program. What this implied 
is that the mandated ethical, legal, and social implications program of the Hu-
man Genome Sequencing Initiative could not serve as a model for the future. 
Essentially the ELSI model (to simplify but not betray) had a mandate to work 
outside and downstream of the technical and scientific work. ELSI’s directive 
was to deal with consequences, specifically “social consequences.” There was a 
broad agreement that at SynBERC (as well as at the NSF funded nano-technol-
ogy centers) the ethics work should be conducted alongside and collaboratively 
with the engineering programs.56
It would appear that Rabinow’s more overt attempts at upstream engage-
ment have also encountered difficulties. Rabinow notes that participation 
in the SynBERC collaboration has not always been smooth and that the 
power relations between the elite bioscientists, engineers, and human sci-
entists place the last in a position of (continuing) subservience and vulner-
ability. We are told, for example, that “the PIs of Human Practices have 
been threatened in an e-mail with replacement, in what can be legitimately 
taken as a petty example of authoritarian power, unless we ‘got along.’” 
Moving into a more ironic register, Rabinow suggests that “[u]pon reflec-
tion, and acknowledging our desire to prosper, we are now getting along.”57 
By way of conclusion Rabinow indicates that he has developed an indignant 
resolve—“a cold vehemence”—to survive and gain “a more just recogni-
tion” of the “substantial efforts and contributions” delivered by the Human 
Practices strand of SynBERC.58
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Perhaps a little obliquely, Rabinow acknowledges the considerable difficul-
ties he has encountered communicating his Human Practices vision to the sci-
entists involved in SynBERC’s other Thrusts. Indeed, continued engagement 
seems to be contingent on compromising the breadth of his original vision. 
Even though Rabinow’s vision for participation is more abstract than many 
other attempts at upstream engagement in science, is less prescriptive, and 
carries fewer obvious agendas (e.g., most commonly some notion of partici-
patory democracy), he would appear to confront problems similar to other 
attempts at engagement with the sciences by social scientists and humanists.59 
Residing discourses are strongly shaped by rationalist or pragmatic orienta-
tions. Even though Rabinow’s efforts acknowledge the pragmatic dimensions 
of undertaking bioscientific research, he appears to have difficulty articulating 
precisely what he can offer as a social scientist/humanist. Moreover, by con-
ceding that so much of what is at stake depends on emergent and contingent 
properties and activities, he is left defending a space for involvement without 
a clear or prescriptive account of what the human scientist can actually do if 
such a space is secured. There is, in addition, little reflection on the costs or 
constraints of inclusion.
Aside from the frustrations caused by his subservient position in the power 
relations at SynBERC, we are tempted to suggest that Rabinow is suffering 
from an inability to characterize his professional identity.60 While the scien-
tists and engineers in the other Thrusts may well have hybrid identities as sci-
entist/entrepreneur, be conversant with ethics and regulatory requirements 
and even with the broader political implications of their research, they nev-
ertheless gain significant legitimacy and power from their primary identity 
and work qua scientists and engineers.61 If SynBERC abandoned its Human 
Practices strand/pretensions it would still produce outcomes and outcomes 
that may not be conspicuously different. There are questions about whether 
Thrust  makes a difference to the social desirability of research and results, 
or the direction of research, or any substantial difference at all.
It is interesting to note that the difficulties experienced by Rabinow’s 
largely experimental Human Practices approach are not altogether new or, 
perhaps, so surprising. In “Prosperity, Amelioration, Flourishing” he ac-
knowledges drawing inspiration from the philosophy of John Dewey. Rabi-
now alludes to Dewey’s contention that for political action to be effective it 
needs to be experimental and emergent, reaching beyond tradition and cus-
tom. Anticipating Rabinow’s own difficulties, Dewey’s “movement” was 
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not favored by the scientists of his own time. Political philosopher Stephen 
Turner explains:
John Dewey, in such works as Human Nature and Conduct, pronounced the ex-
perimental method to be the greatest of human achievements, and he promoted 
the idea of its application to human affairs, replacing “custom” and attainment 
of traditions, such as constitutional traditions, as a basis for political action. Yet 
Dewey distinguished the techniques of science from the spirit: he wanted the 
spirit, and its creativity, in politics, but not the techniques or the experts that 
employed them, or the experts themselves, who he dismissed as specialists and 
technicians whose work needed to be “humanized.” This reasoning, and the 
movement it represented, was not attractive to scientists themselves.62
v.  c o n c l u s I o n
Though not readily accessible to many readers, several basic ideas can be 
distilled from Rabinow’s rich assortment of distinctions, categories, and pro-
grammatic analysis. Rabinow appears to believe that synthetic biology should 
adopt a sophisticated form of self-regulation, predicated upon a reconfiguring 
of the norms, methods, and practices of bioscientists—though he uses the 
more elaborate concept of “equipment” to capture these processes. Reconfig-
uring is presented as a process of learning, somehow precipitated by collabo-
ration between human scientists and bioscientists. In places Rabinow suggests 
that such collaboration and pedagogy are integral features of the engineering 
ethos of the new biosciences and, if not inevitable, then highly likely to eventu-
ate. He never explains, however, why such collaborations are in fact inevitable 
and, in seeming contradiction, at times expresses frustration because attempts 
to facilitate or participate in these forms of collaboration are actually difficult. 
A convincing case for why synthetic biology needs such “equipment” is not 
provided, nor how new norms, methods, and practices can be reinforced and 
reproduced in the communities engaged in synthetic biological research and 
practice. It is not always obvious why pragmatic and entrepreneurial scientists 
and engineers should be inclined to engage, or engage earnestly, with those 
in Human Practices.
In this area, despite his obvious debts to Michel Foucault and the subtle and 
reflexive vocabulary Rabinow uses to describe matters of epistemology, (per-
haps unwittingly) he appears to have much in common with the sociologist 
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Robert Merton. During the 193s and 19s Merton offered what has become 
a highly influential account of scientific norms and their social functions. This 
early work—influenced by Weber, though written largely in response to the rise 
of Fascism in Europe and concerns about its impact on scientific research—
suggested that norms such as universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and 
organized skepticism were central to scientific activity and progress.63
Since they were originally proposed, Merton’s norms have been subjected 
to considerable criticism. Those engaged in the empirical study of scientists 
and engineers—particularly historians and those involved in ethnographic 
studies of scientists, engineers, and their laboratories—have not generated 
evidence to support the contention that Mertonian-style norms guide (or have 
guided) the practices of scientists.64 Rather, their currency seems to be more 
easily linked to various prefigured epistemologies of science (i.e., Mertonian 
norms should exist if science’s objectivity is to be guaranteed) and they have 
been invoked as part of the public ideology of science. Interestingly, while 
idealized norms do not seem to be an essential feature of scientific practice, 
recent commercialization of many areas of biomedical science has introduced 
conspicuous tensions (e.g., private sponsorship and conflicts of interest) that 
make their maintenance even as part of the aspirational public culture of sci-
ence ever more challenging.65
Rabinow’s ideas about “prosperity” and “flourishing” distinguish his work 
from the simplistic models associated with Merton’s early sociological offer-
ings. Nevertheless, Rabinow’s essay resonates with a Merton-type program. 
For his theoretical stance routinely implies or assumes the existence of ideal 
norms and social practices that are necessary (or intrinsic) to the successful 
practice of synthetic biology. Rabinow and those committed to the Mertonian 
framework gain greater warrant for their claims by insisting that the norma-
tive structure they have identified (for science) is intrinsic to science’s survival 
rather than a code of practice or desirable state of affairs.
Understandably, Rabinow wishes to go beyond merely suggesting the de-
sirability of upstream engagement in synthetic biology. However, he seems to 
warrant the involvement of Human Practices on the basis that it is somehow 
intrinsic or necessary to the evolution of new norms. In adopting such a pos-
ture Rabinow inherits extensive criticism of scientific norms. In particular, the 
contention that most normative systems have limited correspondence with 
the behavior of scientists; are not necessary for scientific success (for Rabi-
now “flourishing” and “prospering”); and raise questions about whether they 
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should even be encouraged as desirable forms of behavior. Interestingly, not-
withstanding extensive and persuasive critiques, Merton’s norms of science 
have, as descriptions and aspirational ideals, achieved some resonance with 
the historical rhetoric and vocabulary of scientists. By contrast, it is less likely 
that Rabinow’s complex vocabulary will be as accessible to practicing scien-
tists, regardless of whether or not his nomenclature represents an improved 
approach to the practice and understanding of bioscientific research.66
We hope that Rabinow will continue his path of reflection in relation to the 
difficulties of successful collaboration and consider whether he has adequately 
characterized the features of the emerging engineering ethos of synthetic biol-
ogy. While Rabinow may have successfully identified the entrepreneurial vigor 
and multidisciplinarity of synthetic biology, he may have failed to appreciate 
that the scientists and engineers may not require the type of contributions he 
aspires to provide. It may well be that rather than critique from the inside, the 
emerging engineering ethos associated with synthetic biology may require 
more intensified forms of (traditional models of ) technology assessment and 
regulation. The capacity to evaluate the directions of new types of research at 
arm’s length may well be a precondition to maximizing its social benefits so as 
to flourish rather than flounder. Instead of dealing with the failure of collabora-
tion ironically, it may be that there is a need to retheorize engagement and/or 
consider the renewed importance of external forms of regulation.
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Rabinow, 18.	 supra note 1, at 33–. Taking Dewey’s advice literally, Rabinow makes little attempt to 
engage or even reference extensive literatures on the sociology and anthropology of science, technol-
ogy, and engineering. Consider Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald Markle, James Petersen & Trevor Pinch, eds., 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 199) and Edward Hackettt, Olga 
Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch & Judy Wajcman, eds., The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2).
Rabinow, 19.	 supra note 1, at 3 (footnote omitted).
Id2.	 . at 3 (emphasis in original).
Id21.	 . There are now undergraduate courses in synthetic biology and competitions where students are 
challenged to build functional devices out of biological parts. See Erika Check, “Designs on Life,” 38 
Nature 1 (November 2). 
Rabinow, 22.	 supra note 1, at 3.
Id.23.	  at 3.
Paul Rabinow, Gaymon Bennett & Anthony Stavrianakis, “Response to Synthetic Genomics: Options 2.	
for Governance,” ARC Concept Note No. 1, (Dec. , 26), available at http://anthropos-lab.net/
wp/publications/2/8/conceptnoteno1.pdf (accessed Sept. 21, 29).
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Michelle Garfinkel, Drew Endy, Gerald Epstein & Robert Friedman, 2.	 Synthetic Genomics: Options for 
Governance (Rockville MA: J. Craig Venter Institute, CSIS, 2). This report was circulated in De-
cember 26 and published the following October.




Michael Selgelid, “A Tale of Two Studies: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of Science,” 3.	 3 
Hastings Center Report 3, 1 (2). 
Stephen Collier, Andrew Lakoff & Paul Rabinow, “Biosecurity: Towards an Anthropology of the 31.	
Contemporary,” 2 Anthropology Today 3 (Oct. 2). 
Evelyn Fox Keller,32.	  A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (San Francisco, 
CA: Freeman, 1983).
Rabinow, 33.	 supra note 13, at . The rhetorical links between molecular biology and its commercial poten-
tial have been present from the time of its initial appearance, particularly in the work of James Watson. 
See S. Michael Halloran, “The Birth of Molecular Biology: An Essay in the Rhetorical Criticism of 
Scientific Discourse,” in Landmark Essays on Rhetoric of Science, ed. Randy Allen Harris (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 199). 
This should not be taken to imply that attempts at upstream engagement are always straightforward 3.	
or successful. For a brief discussion of initiatives associated with nanotechnology in the UK, see Nick 
Pidgeon & Tee Rogers-Hayden, “Opening Up Nanotechnology Dialogue with the Publics: Risk 
Communication or ‘Upstream Engagement,’” 9 Health, Risk & Society 191 (2). For a recent over-
view of these issues, see Alan Irwin, “STS Perspectives on Scientific Governance,” in Hackett et al., 
supra note 18, at 83–6. 
See the discussion in Synthetics: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology, IDEA League Summerschool, The 3.	
Netherlands (Aug. 2), Delft University of Technology, http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/
images/uploads/Ethics_of_synthetic_biology.pdf (accessed Sept. 1, 29), and Willem Heemskerk, 
Henk Schallig & Bart de Steenhuijsen Piters, The World of Artemisia in  Questions (Amsterdam: 
The Royal Tropical Institute of the Netherlands, 26) available at http://www.kit.nl/smartsite.
shtml?id=6 (accessed Sept. 1, 29).
Obviously, these arguments will vary depending on who owns the IP and how any product is manufac-36.	
tured and distributed. While tree cropping might not represent large numbers of jobs, the example in-
dicates how particular technological frames might obscure implications or even close off alternatives.
Sheila Jasanoff, 3.	 Science at the Bar: Law Science and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 199).
By way of a thought experiment, we wonder whether having human scientists in U.S. banks would have 38.	
influenced banking practices in ways that might have limited or reduced the recent (i.e., 28–29) 
series of collapses. Here, again, it is useful to reflect upon self-regulation by interested participants and 
what flourishing might mean, and for whom.
For a classic overview of various traditions and different interpretations of the meanings of technoc-39.	
racy, consider David Elliot & Ruth Elliot, The Control of Technology (London: Wykeham Publications, 
196), 1–11.
Hedgecoe and Martin suggest that notwithstanding claims that genomics has been transformational in .	
terms of scientific knowledge, practices, and forms of public engagement, a more realistic assessment 
would address the unevenness of changes corresponding with different regulatory regimes and local 
political cultural and institutional factors. While Rabinow may be correct in identifying changes in pat-
terns of laboratory practices and fields of expertise, his tendency to extrapolate and generalize patterns 
and the consequences of such changes might be difficult to sustain empirically. We will return to these 
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points later in this essay. See Adam Hedgecoe & Paul Martin, “Genomics, STS, and the Making of 
Sociotechnical Futures” in Hackett et al., supra note 18, at 81–39.
Jasanoff, 1.	 supra note 3; David S. Caudill & L.H. LaRue, No Magic Wand: A Non-Romantic View of 
Expert Testimony (Washington, D.C.: Center for Public Justice, 26).
To be fair, we understand that Rabinow has not turned his attention to this issue, but his reconceptu-2.	
alization does embody a range of implications and potentials that are worth contemplating. Here, we 
do not mean to suggest that the current state of affairs is ideal. As things stand, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 9 U.S. 9 (1993) represents a confused model of science and is operationalized 
in ways that are not merely inconsistent but often lack principle. See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, 
“Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate and Judicial Attitudes towards 
the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Tort Litigation,” 26 Law & Policy 231 (2).
See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, “Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of History, Philosophy 3.	
and Sociology of Science in US Federal Courts,” 1 Law & Literature 39 (22). 
It would be our contention that metascientists in other traditions might offer more serviceable models, .	
ironically, better suited to the exigencies of practice. Though, as the discussion by Lynch and Cole 
suggests, such interactions can be complex and protracted. See Michael Lynch & Simon Cole, “Sci-
ence and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise,” 3 Social Studies of Science 269 (2). 
See also Harry Collins & Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2).
Kara Swanson, “Biotech in Court: A Legal Lesson on the Unity of Science,” .	 3 Social Studies of Sci-
ence 3 (2); Alberto Cambrosio, Peter Keating & Michael MacKenzie, “Scientific Practice in the 
Courtroom: The Construction of Sociotechnical Identities in a Biotechnology Patent Dispute,” 3 
Social Problems 2 (199); Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and 
the Social Order (London: Routledge, 2).
See Gary Edmond, “Judging the Scientific and Medical Literature: Some Legal Implications of 6.	
Changes to Biomedical Research and Publication,” 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (28).
Sheldon Krimsky, .	 Science in the Private Interest (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 23); Wendy Wag-
ner & Rena Steinzor, eds., Rescuing Science from Politics: Regulation and the Distortion of Scientific Re-
search (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 26).
Phil Fontanarosa, Annette Flanagin & Catherine DeAngelis, “Reporting Conflicts of Interest, Finan-8.	
cial Aspects of Research, and Role of Sponsors in Funded Studies,” 29 JAMA 11 (2); Annette 
Flanagin, Phil Fontanarosa & Catherine DeAngelis, “Update on JAMA’s Conflict of Interest Policy,” 
296 JAMA 22 (26); Sheldon Krimsky, “Small Gifts, Conflicts of Interest, and the Zero-Tolerance 
Threshold in Medicine,” 3 American Journal of Bioethics  (23). See infra note 6.
The Cochrane Collaboration and the efforts by the International Committee of Medical Journal Edi-9.	
tors are examples of attempts to overcome some of these problems. See International Committee of 
Medical Journal, eds., Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing 
and Editing for Biomedical Publication (2), http://www.ICMJE.org.
Stephen Turner, “What Is the Problem with Experts?,” .	 31 Social Studies of Science 123 (21); Alan 
Irwin & Mike Michael, Science, Social Theory and Public Knowledge (Maidenhead: Open University 
Press, 23).
Marcia Stone, “Life Redesigned to Suit the Engineering Crowd,” 1.	 1 Microbe 66 (26); Hans Bügl 
et al., “DNA Synthesis and Biological Security,” 2 Nature Biotechnology 62 (2); Laurie Zoloth, 
“Ethical Issues in Synthetic Biology: Security and Regulation in Experiments of Concern,” A White 
Paper on the Ethics of Self-Governance in New Scientific Community (Chicago: Town Hall Meeting 
Series, Center for Bioethics, Science and Society, Northwestern University, 26), available at http://
www.synbioproject.org/topics/synbio11/bibliography/governance/ (accessed Oct. 1,	29).
Garfinkel et al.,2.	  supra note 2.
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Bennett & Rabinow, “Invitation: Synthetic Biology and Human Practices,” 3.	 supra note 8.
At the time of writing (December .	 28–February 29) we are reliant upon accounts by Rabinow and 
Bennett. Maurer, and others who were involved, may or may not publish their versions of the matter 
in due course.
Bennett & Rabinow, “Invitation: Synthetic Biology and Human Practices,” .	 supra note 8, at 2–3 (Syn-
thetic Biology 1.: The First International Meeting on Synthetic Biology, MIT (June 1–12, 2); 
Synthetic Biology 2.: The Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology, UC Berkeley (May 
2–22, 26)).
Id6.	 . at .
Rabinow, .	 supra note 1, at 318. See also the works cited in note .
Rabinow, 8.	 supra note 1, at 318. Perhaps revealingly, this episode reminded us of some of the interac-
tions between the poor and those with power and affluence in Scott’s studies of peasant resistance. 
See James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 198) and James Scott, Domination and Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 199).
Consider, for example, the problems encountered by analysts in the debate between Collins, and Rich-9.	
ards, Martin and Scott: Pam Scott, Evelleen Richards & Brian Martin, “Captives of Controversy: The 
Myth of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies,” 1 Science, Technol-
ogy, & Human Values  (199); Harry Collins, “Captives and Victims: Comment on Scott, Richards 
and Martin,” 16 Science, Technology & Human Values 29 (1991); Brian Martin, Evelleen Richards & 
Pam Scott, “Who’s a Captive? Who’s a Victim? Response to Collins’ Method Talk,” 16 Science, Tech-
nology, & Human Values 29 (1991).
For the classic STS formulation of the processes of scientists establishing and demarcating their profes-6.	
sional identities, see Thomas Gieryn, “Boundary Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-
science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,” 8 American Sociological Review 
81 (1983); David Mercer, “Seen but Not Heard? Assessing the Impact of STS in Legal and Regulatory 
Settings Involving Controversial Science,” in Yearbook 2 of the Institute for Advanced Studies on 
Science Technology and Society, ed. Arno Bamme, Gunter Getzinger & Bernhard Wieser (Wien: Profil 
Munchen, 2); Simon Cole, “A Cautionary Tale about Cautionary Tales about Intervention,” 16 
Organization 121 (29).
David Mercer, “Hyper Experts and the Vertical Integration of Expertise in EMF/RF Litigation,” in 61.	
Expertise in Regulation and Law, ed. Gary Edmond (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2), 8–9. 
Stephen Turner, “The Social Study of Science before Kuhn,” in Hackett et al, 62.	 supra note 18, at 1–2. 
Robert Merton, 63.	 The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 193), 266–8. “Communalism” and “communality” are often substituted for 
“communism.”
Michael Mulkay, “Norms and Ideology in Science,” 6.	  Social Sciences Information 63 (199); Ian 
Mitroff, The Subjective Side of Science (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 19).
Consider6.	  Kenneth Rothman, “Conflict of Interest: The New McCarthyism in Science,” 269 JAMA 
282 (1993); Mario Biagioli, “Aporias of Scientific Authorship: Credit and Responsibility in Contem-
porary Biomedicine,” in The Science Studies Reader, ed. M. Biagioli (New York: Routledge, 1999), 26; 
and Philip Mirowski & Mirjam Sent, eds., Science Bought and Sold: Essays in the Economics of Science 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 22).
Mulkay, 66.	 supra note 6.
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